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Norat
Nora was born into a working-class family in Cortes, Honduras on June
19, 1952. She attended school to the sixth grade, then went to work in a
poultry packing factory to supplement the family's income. In October
1988, at the age of fifteen, Nora married Francisco, the seventeen-year-
old son of a locally prominent, well-to-do family. One night in Septem-
ber 1989, just at the end of their first year together, Francisco returned
home, became inexplicably violent, and viciously beat Nora. He
slammed her against the wall, dislocating her wrist, and beat her face
until her eye was swollen shut and her lip was deeply cut. When he
finally stopped beating her he locked her in the living room where she
collapsed on the floor. Early the next morning Nora escaped and fled to
her family's home. From that day on, she never again lived with Fran-
cisco. Her family, upon seeing her, rushed her to the hospital. Her
brothers wanted to seek revenge on Francisco, but their father dis-
suaded them, convincing them instead to file a complaint with the
police. The police told her brothers it would cost approximately one
week's salary to file a complaint, that the process would be lengthy, and
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at Queens College; B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1978; J.D., New York Law
School, 1982. I am indebted to Patrick Young, Isabelle Gunning, and Dolly Hassan
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks to Michele Hogan
for her early research assistance and insights into some of the arguments developed
more fully here. Deepest gratitude to Rita Mella for her invaluable insights and
research and editing assistance, and to Juan Fernandez for his support and
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1. The facts described herein are based on an actual case currently pending in a
New York City Immigration Court (Executive Office for Immigration Review) [here-
inafter EOIR]. The names and some details have been altered to protect the confi-
dentiality of the client and the legal posture of the case, as well as to provide a more
linear sequence of events. A brief in support of Nora's claim was filed with the EOIR
in June 1992 and is on file with the author, who is counsel in the case under the
auspicies of the Immigrants' Rights Clinic at CUNY Law School, Main Street Legal
Services.
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that nothing would come of it in the end because she was his "woman"
and he could do what he wanted to her. Realizing the police were
unwilling to help her, Nora took refuge the next day at her grand-
mother's house in a remote village three hours away. After spending
several weeks there, Nora returned to her parents' home. Within a few
days, Francisco found her there alone. At gunpoint he forced her into a
bedroom and raped her. Unaware that she was pregnant as a result of
the rape, she returned in fear to her grandmother's home.
One day during her seventh month of pregnancy, Nora was waiting
for a bus when suddenly a car careened off the road onto the sidewalk,
struck her from behind, and dragged her down the road for almost two
blocks before she was freed and the car sped away. Bystanders took
down the license plate number of the car before it drove out of sight.
Unconscious and bleeding, she was rushed to the hospital where she
remained in a coma for three days. Three days after her discharge she
returned to the hospital to give birth to her daughter who was born two
months premature, weighing 3 1/2 pounds. The police traced the
license plate number of the car that had so violently struck her to Fran-
cisco. He was required to pay Nora's hospital bill. No investigation was
conducted. No charges were brought against him. Some months later
Francisco took the baby and refused to return her. When Nora went to
the courthouse to file kidnapping and assault charges against Francisco
for abducting the baby and for striking her with the car, the clerk refused
to accept the papers. Under the advice of counsel, she withdrew the
assault charges and brought only the kidnapping claim. Once in court,
she was still not permitted to testify as to the rape at gunpoint nor of the
vehicular assault. After several court dates, she was awarded custody.
The final episode occurred when Francisco returned to Nora's
home and fired shots at both her and her mother. Upon hearing what
had transpired, Nora's brother summoned the police and insisted on
pressing charges for assault and trespassing, which he added in the
belief that the police would find that a more "acceptable" charge. The
police refused, saying it was a "domestic dispute." Convinced that
neither she nor her family would be safe as long as she remained in
Honduras, Nora left her daughter and most of her money with her sister
and fled on foot to the United States.2
2. Within a day after crossing the Rio Grande from Mexico into a small Texas
border town, Nora was apprehended by the INS and placed in deportation proceed-
ings. Charged with entry without inspection, she was ordered to show cause why she
should not be deported back to Honduras. An Order to Show Cause (OSC) is the
charging document that serves to commence deportation proceedings in the EOIR.
8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (1993). Under the U.S. immigration laws (the Immigration &
Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C '§ 1101 (1988 & Supp. 1992)), there seemed to be no
remedy available to her. She had no relatives or employment which would allow her
to petition for a visa pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993), and she is
ineligible for suspension of deportation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 244.1-.2 (1993), since
she just arrived in the United States.
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Julila3
Julila has been married to her husband Rahinder for twenty-two years.
They have two sons together. The younger son, who is now fifteen years
old, has serious medical problems, is handicapped, and has the mental
capacity of an eight-year-old. Rahinder is a lawful permanent resident in
the United States, a status which he acquired after coming to the United
States from Pakistan in 1981. Julila came to join him in 1985 on a visi-
tor's visa that has long since expired. Julila is now "undocumented,"
meaning that she is without any legal immigration status. For most of
their marriage Julila did as she was told, never questioning Rahinder's
authority. At first he regularly would bring home other women, flaunt-
ing them in front of her. After their second son was born, Rahinder
blamed Julila, saying it was her fault and that she was no good. Shortly
after Julila moved to the United States, Rahinder became increasingly
abusive, first verbally and then physically. He forbade her to learn Eng-
lish and wouldn't allow her to work or to attend beauty school. He
would slap and punch her, and call her corrupt, unfaithful, and a whore.
He repeatedly threatened to send her back to Pakistan without her chil-
dren. When she began learning English against his wishes, he stopped
contributing to the care of their handicapped son and refused to give
her enough money to cover all the medical and household expenses.
Over the last several years Rahinder has become increasingly vio-
lent, beating her severely at least once or twice a month. On one occa-
sion, after he beat her and she fled the premises, he performed a ritual
Moslem divorce from her in the presence of her brothers. Her sons are
now twenty-one and fifteen, and she has found a shelter that will accept
her without regard to her immigration status. Throughout their years
together, Rahinder refused to petition for her to obtain lawful status,
threatening to turn her in to the INS if she didn't do as he said and
telling her she didn't deserve legal immigration status. She has no
means of obtaining legal status other than through her marriage, but
now that she's left her husband she wants nothing more to do with him.
She is afraid of how he will treat her. She believes that he will never
agree to petition for her. She had considered returning to Pakistan.
However, just before she decided to leave her husband she confided to
her family of his abuse. Her family told her that they had already spoken
to his family and knew all about her refusal to submit to her husband
and that she would find no solace there. One of her brothers threatened
her, saying that no sister of his would get away with disrespecting her
husband. Rahinder's family has also threatened to harm her if she
should leave him and try to return to Pakistan. She believes that either
or both families would carry out their threats, because in Pakistan
3. The facts described herein are based primarily on a case currently pending
before the INS. The names and some of the details have been changed to protect the
woman on whose claims these facts are based. The case is not currently in the proce-
dural posture of an asylum claim; however, the facts as set out here are those in which
such a claim would be contemplated if no other relief were available.
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women are absolutely expected to do their husband's bidding. Julila
also believes that the police and the courts would do nothing to protect
her-nor would they be able to-because the family is considered sacro-
sanct and the law will not act in any way to interfere in such matters.
She is very fearful of returning to Pakistan, yet has no way to gain lawful
status or authorization to work in this country.
Introduction
The stories described above are not unique. Many undocumented
women have come forward with similar allegations and fears.4 United
States immigration law has not addressed the problems presented by
women in these situations. 5 In recent years, feminist advocates have
begun developing asylum law theories of representation for gender-
based claims of persecution. 6 These cases challenge gender-based per-
4. Although there are no official studies on the number of undocumented immi-
grant women in the United States who have fled battering or are currently living in a
battering situation, a few anecdotal studies have been done indicating that neither
scenario is unusual. The focus of these few studies, however, has been on immigrant
women who are being battered by their spouse in the United States. Virtually no
data exist on the extent to which women have fled their batterers in their home coun-
tries and. sought safe haven in the United States. See CHRIS HOGELAND & KAREN
ROSEN, DREAMS LOST, DREAMS FOUND: UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN IN THE LAND OF
OPPORTUNITY, A SURVEY RESEARCH PROJECT OF CHINESE, FILIPINA, AND LATINA
UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN (1991).
5. In order to gain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status through marriage,
the spouse who is a U.S. citizen or LPR must file an application on behalf of the one
seeking status. Prior to 1990, a person whose spouse petitioned for her when the
couple had been married less than two years could only keep her lawful permanent
resident status if he filed a second application within 90 days of the end of a two year
period of "conditional residency." 8 U.S.C. § 1 186(a)-(b) (1988). There now exists a
waiver of filing the second joint petition to remove conditional status if a spouse can
show, inter alia, that she or her child was battered or subject to extreme cruelty by
the petitioning spouse. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (Supp. 1992). This remedy, though
an important advance, does not address the legal obstacles to gaining LPR status of a
woman whose spouse refuses to petition for her, because the waiver only applies in
marriages where the initial petition is filed less than two years after the marriage. It
also fails to address problems confronting women married to a man who himself
does not have legal status.
Currently there is pending before Congress the Violence Against Women Act of
1993, S. 11 and H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). One of the provisions of
the House bill allows for a married woman who has been battered by her spouse to
file a petition on her own behalf without the cooperation of the LPR or U.S. spouse.
If the Act is enacted with this provision intact, it will provide relief for many women
in situations similar to Julila's. It will not address the problem confronted by Nora,
nor by a woman whose situation may be simliar to Julila's except that she and her
abuser are not married, or her abuser himself also does not have legal immigration
status. Thus while its passage would be a significant breakthrough in the protection
of women under the immigration laws, this provision of the 1993 Act will not resolve
the problem addressed in this article.
6. The focus of this article is on making a gender-based claim for asylum under
U.S. law. There have been recent changes in the asylum law in Canada expanding
the protection from gender-related persecution for women and there have been
some interesting case developments in some other European countries. See Pamela
Goldberg, Where in the World Is There Safety for Me. Safe Haven for Women Fleeing Gender-
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secution, and practices or treatment that impact adversely on women in
ways that are different from the impact on men. 7 One of the newest
developments in asylum law theories is fashioning a claim for asylum
where the actual or feared persecution is intimate violence.8 Simultane-
ously, there has been a surge in efforts by feminist advocates and schol-
ars to have issues of concern to women addressed under international
human rights law with a correlative response in the intergovernmental
sphere. Violence against women, and specifically intimate violence, is
increasingly being recognized as a human rights violation, and interna-
tional protections and methods of recourse are being devised and
proposed.9
This article takes the position that United States asylum law must
recognize and take into account the advances in the international human
rights arena in addressing violence against women. In doing so, U.S.
asylum law must recognize gender-based persecution claims, in particu-
lar claims based on intimate violence.
This article will discuss the theoretical basis for establishing eligibil-
ity for asylum under U.S. immigration law, which requires showing a
well-founded fear of persecution by the state or a force that the state
either cannot or will not control, on account of membership in a particu-
Based Persecution, in WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE (Julie
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., forthcoming 1994).
7. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting peti-
tioner's argument that she was a member of a "particular social group" for purposes
of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution as a basis for eligibility for asylum);
Fatin v. INS, No. 92-3346 (3d Cir. 1992); Matter of BA (appeal pending before the
BIA). This applicant is represented by the author under the auspices of CUNY Law
School (all papers on file with the author).
8. I adopt the definition of intimate violence contained in the Draft Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/WG.2/1992/L.3,
which, in defining violence against women, states that the term means:
[A]ny act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether
occurring in public or private life.... [It] shall be understood to encompass,
but not be limited to, the following: (a) physical, sexual and psychological
violence occurring in the family, including battering, ... marital rape ...
non-spousal violence ....
Id. at 5. Protection from acts of intimate violence should not be limited to those
occurring within the context of marriage, but should rather encompass acts perpe-
trated by any male intimate whether or not related by blood. I choose the term "inti-
mate violence" because I believe it is more inclusive of the many types of close
relationships a woman may have with a male who mistreats her. In contrast, the term
"domestic violence" connotes a kind of tame, less serious violence. No term ade-
quately conveys the terror of being trapped in a relationship of violence, nor the
sinister and controlling power that such a relationship confers on the male. For a
discussion of the range and degree of acts of intimate violence, see generally LENORE
E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED
WOMEN KILL (1987).
9. For a discussion of some recent developments in the treatment of violence
against women as human rights restrictions, see Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly,
International Human Rights and Violence Against l1'omen, 6 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 195
(1993).
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lar social group or political opinion, when that fear stems from intimate
violence, 10 This article will elaborate on the standard for proving asy-
lum eligibility and will proceed to analyze each part of that standard.
First, this article will address the well-founded fear prong of the
standard and show that a woman fleeing intimate violence meets this
standard with little difficulty. Next, this article will discuss how the con-
duct a woman fears from a batterer constitutes persecution. In doing so,
this article will argue that these acts constitute serious, if not egregious,
violations of internationally recognized and protected human rights and
as such rise to the level of persecutory acts, the protection from which is
envisioned by the Refugee Act of 1980. Furthermore, this article will
take the position that, where serious violations of human rights are com-
mitted and the state fails or refuses to act, such failure to act on the part
of the state is in itself an act of persecution.
Second, this article will discuss the accountability of the state in the
perpetration of those acts. This article will argue that in failing to act on
behalf of women in the face of egregious or serious violations of human
rights, the state is, on the one hand, liable for the commission of those
persecutory acts, and on the other, its refusal or failure to act is itself
persecution. Under international law the state has an obligation to exer-
cise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish viola-
tions of human rights." In the case of intimate violence, the state's
liability derives from its inability or unwillingness to control the men
who commit acts of intimate violence.
Third, this article will demonstrate that the acts of persecution com-
mitted against a woman in this context, and her fear of such future acts,
were and would continue to be on account of either or both of two
grounds-her membership in a particular social group and her political
opinion. This article will define two alternative social groups of which a
battered woman is a member, the first more broadly defined as the social
group of women, with the showing that the acts of violence are perpe-
trated against them on account of their membership within that group,
and the second a more narrowly defined social group of women who
have been battered by a male intimate and are unable to receive protec-
tion from the state. Finally, this article will present the argument that a
woman who resists or attempts to resist intimate violence is expressing a
political opinion on account of which she has been persecuted or has a
well-founded fear of future persecution. The violence is the repression
of that opinion, either by the batterer with the tacit approval of the state
or by the state itself through the batterer. t2
10. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158 (1988).
11. See infra Part IV, especially notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
12. Resistance to violence is not a necessary component of every gender-based
claim. For example, a woman may be refusing to comply with traditional societal or
religious norms that are repressive, and thus has a well-founded fear of persecution
based on the knowledge that she will be subjected to violence or other harsh treat-
ment due to her refusal to comply, even though she has not yet suffered any persecu-
tory acts. See, e.g., Brief of the Amici Curiae, (American Immigration Lawyers
Vol. 26
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I. Developing a Theory of Intimate Violence as an Asylum Claim Basis
In order to establish eligibility for a discretionary grant of asylum,' 3 a
person must show that she has been persecuted in the past or has a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of either her race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.' 4 To satsify the statutory requirement under U.S. asylum law,
acts of persecution or feared persecution must have been committed by
the government or by groups or individuals that the government either
cannot or will not control.15 State liability for persecutory acts may be
found where the state has failed or refused to act or intervene on behalf
of an individual against whom acts of persecution are being or have
Association, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Women's
Asylum Project of Cambridge, and Somerville Legal Services, Inc.), Fatin v. INS, No.
92-3346 (3rd Cir. 1992); David L. Neal, Note, Women As A Social Group: Recognizing
Sex-Based Persecution As Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 203 (1988).
13. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(42), 1158 (1988). Once one shows eligibility for asylum,
the judge may still deny the relief sought in the exercise of discretion. While an
immigration judge's discretion is broad, it is not without limits. See Melendez v. U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, 926 F.2d 211, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1991); Matter of Pula, Int. Dec. 3033
(BIA 1987).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). The relevant text of the statute reads:
The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id.
Where a showing is made of actual past persecution, an individual is statutorily
eligible for a grant of asylum. If the government comes forward with evidence that
little likelihood of future persecution exists, or if the presiding official takes adminis-
trative notice of a change in the conditions in the home country which led to the
flight, the court may consider that factor in determining whether to exercise discre-
tion favorably. Neither circumstance is a bar to a grant of asylum but only a factor,
however significant, in the exercise of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (1993);
Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989); ASYLUM BRANCH, OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., BASIC LAW MANUAL: ASYLUM, SUM-
MARY AND OVERVIEW CONCERNING ASYLUM LAW 25 (1991) [hereinafter INS MANUAL].
When a woman has suffered serious acts of violence perpetrated by a male relative
or intimate, she has established past persecution apart from any well-founded fear of
future persecution. It must be noted that, as a practical matter, very few claims of
asylum have been granted based on past persecution, the Chen case being the most
notable example; rather, past acts tend to be used as an indicator of the well-
foundedness of future persecution. In the text and notes that follow, the standard
requiring a showing of either actual past persecution or well-founded fear of future
persecution is intended at all times. There may be instances when only one of the
two circumstances is referred to. It should be understood that, in any case, meeting
either one of the two standards is sufficient to establish eligibility for asylum.
15. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 25. See, e.g., Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227,
1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981);
Matter of Villalta, Int. Dec. 3126, at 8 (BIA 1990).
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been committed.' 6
Acts of persecution, no matter how heinous, do not establish eligi-
bility for asylum unless they can be shown to be on account of one of the
enumerated grounds. 17 Recently the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that in order to show that the fear of persecution is on account of
one of the five grounds, an individual must provide some evidence,
whether "direct or circumstantial," of the persecutor's motive for harm-
ing or seeking to harm her. 18 The precise way in which this may be
shown will depend on the exact ground on which the feared or actual
persecution is based.19
Thus, under asylum law, in order for a woman in Nora's orJulila's
situation to establish eligibility for asylum, she must show that she has a
well-founded fear of persecution by the government or a force that the
government either cannot or will not control, on account of either her
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. The factual basis for her fear appears at first glance
not to be consistent with a more typical asylum claim; yet upon closer
examination of the facts and careful application of the law, it will be
shown that she does, in fact, have a viable claim for asylum under tradi-
tional asylum law analysis. 20 Although there are obstacles in meeting
16. See, e.g., INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 25. "A person is a refugee if he or she
has a well-founded fear of persecution (as a result of one of the five factors in the
definition) because he or she is not adequately protected by his or her government."
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
18. INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992) (holding inter alia, that the
statute regarding asylum makes motive critical and therefore the respondent "must
provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial"). Arguably this holding can be
limited to the facts of the case, in which the respondent Zacarias was fleeing forced
recruitment into the armed opposition in Guatemala. The Court found that mere
forcible recruitment into armed military service, whether by the government or insur-
gent forces, does not rise to the level of persecution, and absent more, mere resist-
ance to such service does not constitute an expression of a political opinion on
account of which an individual is being persecuted. Id. at 815-16. Some have argued
that this decision is inconsistent with past Supreme Court decisions and an inappro-
priate interpretation of the law of asylum in the United States. See, e.g., Deborah E.
Anker et al., The United States Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Elias Zacarias: Is There any
"There" There?, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASEs No. 9, 285 (Mar. 9, 1992); Craig A. Fielden,
Persecution on Account of Political Opinion: "'Refugee" Status After INS v. Eliaz-Zacarias,
112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), 67 WASH. L. REv. 959 (1992).
19. For the first opinion by a circuit court upon remand by the Supreme Court for
consideration under the Zacarias decision, see Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599,
602 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Zacarias to preclude granting of asylum based on a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of religion (conscientious objection to
military service) under the facts before the court, but granting it based on a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion, finding that a political
opinion imputed by the persecutor, "by definition, includes an element of motive. A
persecutor falsely attributes an opinion to the victim and then persecutes the victim
because of that mistaken belief about the victim's view.") (citation omited).
20. For a general discussion of some of the difficulties in establishing refugee
status for gender-based persecution, see M. Jane Kronenberger, Refugee Women:
Establishing a Prima Fade Case Under the Refugee Convention, 15 ILSA J. INT'L L. 61
(1992). See also Felicite Stairs & Lori Pope, No Place Like Home: Assaulted Migrant
Women 's Claims to Refugee Status and Landings on Humanitarian and Compassionate Grounds,
Vol 26
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the statutory eligibility requirements for a grant of asylum based on acts
of intimate violence, this article will show that even the most difficult of
these can be satisfied. The first step will be to show that the fear a bat-
tered woman has of her batterer is well-founded. 2 1 This is perhaps the
easiest element of the standard to meet. The second step will be to
show that the acts committed against a woman in the context of intimate
violence rise to the level of persecution. 22 The nature and degree of the
violence perpetrated in the course of intimate violence will constitute
serious, if not egregious, violations of women's human rights. As a prac-
tical matter, acts of intimate violence often are egregious.23 In fact, in
many cases the conduct is as heinous as-and amounts to-acts of tor-
ture. The acts of violence were this extreme in Nora's case, for example.
Acts of this severity undoubtedly rise to the level of persecution.24
This article will argue that even if the acts are considered to be
neither torture nor egregious human rights violations, at a minimum
acts of intimate violence constitute serious abuses of a woman's human
rights and as such rise to the level of persecution. Julila's case is an
example of the kind of acts that may not rise to the level of torture or
egregious violations of human rights but are serious abuses of rights
protected under international law and so constitute persecution.25 Fur-
ther, this article will argue that regardless of the serious degree of the
acts themselves, a failure of the state to protect a woman from acts of
violence is itself a form of persecution.
The next step, and the most difficult both conceptually and practi-
cally, will be to address state liability for these persecutory acts. Acts of
persecution, no matter how severe they may be, cannot be based solely
on a personal dispute or vendetta. 26 Intimate violence occurs out of
public view, behind closed doors, in the home. Traditional human
6J.L. & Soc. POL. 148, for a discussion of establishing refugee status under the Con-
vention for women who have been battered.
21. See supra note 14 for a discussion about the difficulties of establishing eligibil-
ity for asylum based on past persecution.
22. Although no statutory definition of persecution exists under U.S. asylum law,
nor is there a definition of persecution in the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, there is a body of case law and other interpretive documents that give us a
picture of what constitutes persecution. See, e.g., Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir.
1969); INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-22; OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979), [hereinafter UNHCR
HANDBOOK].
23. See WALKER, supra note 8; BROWNE, supra note 8.
24. In that case, as described above in supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text,
among the acts of violence are a rape at gunpoint which led to pregnancy; and delib-
erately and maliciously running her down with a car causing, among other injuries,
two months premature labor and birth. Other violent acts include assault with a knife
and a gun. Such extreme acts should not be necessary to make out a showing of
persecution. Something less than this should legally suffice.
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In addition, her life and safety were
threatened by both her own and her husband's families should she return to Pakistan.
26. See, e.g., Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988).
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rights law (and virtually all other discourses except feminism) 27 has sep-
arated out acts that occur in the public sector from those that transpire
in the private sphere. Slowly, this distinction is beginning to crumble.28
Nonetheless, insofar as the distinction continues to be made, there is
ample support for the argument that the state is liable for the persecu-
tory acts of private individuals. 29
Where a woman has sought, to no avail, police or court protection,
or where such efforts would be futile because no protection is available
to her, the state may be held responsible for, if not complicitous in,
those acts.30 The state's failure to act to protect her or to prevent or
punish the acts of violence against her constitutes liability for the com-
mission of those acts of violence. The state has an affirmative obligation
to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish violations of human
rights. The failure or refusal to act-the omission-is equivalent to the
commission of the act itself in assessing culpability. In its failure to act,
the state allows the acts to continue unabated and unredressed, thus giv-
ing the abuser the freedom to act with impunity. Liability is thus con-
ferred on the state for the commission of those persecutory acts.3 '
The final prong is to show that the well-founded fear of persecution
is on account of one of the five enumerated grounds. In the case of
intimate violence, this prong can be met through one of two grounds:
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. The partic-
ular difficulty for claims based on intimate violence under this prong of
the standard is in showing the link between the acts committed and the
ground-political opinion or social group-on which the acts are said to
have been committed.3 2
H. Well-Founded Fear
One who claims eligibility for asylum owing to a well-founded fear of
persecution must show that the fear is, in fact, well-founded. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the well-foundedness of the fear of per-
27. See generally Hillary Charlesworth, The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to
Development in International Law, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1992); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); Celina Romany,
Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human
Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 87 (1993); Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Under-
standing Domestic Violence as Torture, in INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
(Rebecca Cook ed., 1994).
28. See generally supra note 27.
29. For a discussion on the failure of a state to act, constituting an act of commis-
sion and, therefore culpability, see, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs
and the Responsibility of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1 (1989-90); Gordon Christenson,
Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12 MICH. J. INr'L L. 312 (Winter 1991); VELAZ-
QUEZ RODRIGUEZ CASE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
30. See supra note 29.
31. See supra note 27.
32. INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). See supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion and critique of this case.
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secution to mean a reasonable possibility that an individual would be
persecuted-even a one-in-ten chance that someone would suffer perse-
cution upon return to the home country would be sufficient to show that
the fear is well-founded.3 3 The Board of Immigration Appeals 34 has
further stated that a fear of persecution is well-founded if a reasonable
person similarly situated would fear persecution. 35 In INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Supreme Court ruled that this showing of well-foundedness
encompasses a subjective and an objective component.3 6 The individual
must subjectively fear, and that fear must be grounded in objective real-
ity. In the case of battered women, generally there will be no difficulty
in showing the woman subjectively experiences fear. The trauma and
fear women suffer at the hands of their batterers is so widely known and
accepted that the courts should, at least arguably, take judicial notice of
it.3 7
To establish the objective basis of this fear, in an elaboration of the
"reasonable person similarly situated" test 38 mentioned above, a person
must be able to show that the fear has "some basis in the reality of the
circumstances [and not] mere irrational apprehension. '39 In the case of
33. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
34. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is an administrative review body
created through regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1.
35. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028, at 445 (BIA 1987) (following Guevara-
Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986)).
36. INS v, Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
37. See generally WALKER, supra note 8; BROWNE, supra note 8. In the context of the
INS and the Executive Office for Immigration Review, including the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, it would be taking administrative notice, and there is BIA authority
for doing so. See Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989).
38. The objective basis of the fear component of the test raises a number of ques-
tions about how objectivity is defined and by whom. Under the patriarchal system in
which we live, objectivity is synonymous with male-specifically white, middle-to-
upper class male. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODFIED: Dis-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RiGHTs (1991). One of the reasons there is no gender category in the ennumerated
grounds for establishing asylum/refugee eligibility stems precisely from this male-
domination of the social, political, and legal structures. This also speaks to why gen-
der-based persecution claims have yet to be recognized in most countries, including
in the United States. Finally, this issue of objectivity is closely related to the distinc-
tion between the public and the private realms which relegates the traditional realm
of women's activites into the private, unprotected sphere, and views the world of men
as being public and therefore worthy of protection from interference. What is con-
sidered private, the home and family-women's world-is seen as not relevant to
political discourse and so is not protected in the same way as the so-called "public"
sphere of men. For an in-depth discussion of the need for a re-examination of the
public/private distinction in international human rights discourse, see generally
Romany, supra note 27. For a discussion on the need to incorporate a standard of
reasonableness using a woman's point of view, see State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548,
558-59 (Wash. 1977) (ruling, inter alia, that a reasonable person standard cannot be
that of "reasonable man" but must take into account the situation of the "person"
and must, in situations of violence against a woman, reflect a reasonable woman stan-
dard). See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding a rea-
sonable women standard must be applied in cases of sexual harassment).
39. Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). The case was
cited favorably by the BIA in its first decision interpreting Cardoza-Fonseca, where the
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battered women, this can be done in several ways. Expert testimony can
be presented to show that the woman's testimony of what transpired,
both the abuser's treatment of her and her response to it, is consistent
with current understanding of battering. Expert testimony also can be
presented on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), verifying that her
reactions and psychological state are consistent with that disorder.40
This expert could assert that as with other situations of extreme stress
and/or violence such as traditionally recognized forms of torture, bat-
tering in the intimate sphere can, due to the nature of the acts, likewise
induce a state of PTSD.
Where possible, corroborative evidence such as police or medical
reports should be introduced. This is rarely possible in asylum cases
generally, and will be no more likely in claims of battering. In many
circumstances, for any number of reasons, a woman may not have been
willing or able to seek outside help. There may not be any records in
existence, or insofar as records exist they may be unattainable. Another
possibility, though equally difficult, would be to present witness testi-
mony-written or oral-by a relative or friend who was present on any
occasion of battering, as to the occurrence of the abuse. Again, there
seldom will be any such witness and, even where there were, it is most
unlikely that person will be available to testify.
Often asylum seekers, including battered women, have no witnesses
to the acts of violence perpetrated against them, and have no corrobora-
tive proof that the acts occurred. The difficulty for asylum applicants to
obtain proof of their actual or feared persecution has been recognized
by the courts,4 1 and has been codified in the asylum regulations42 and in
the INS' internal guidelines. 43 If there is no independent proof avail-
able, one can rely on the testimony of the applicant alone. An asylum
applicant's "testimony [that] is believable, consistent, and sufficiently
detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his
fear" is sufficient. 4 4
BIA explicitly adopted the Guevara-Flores language as controlling. Matter of Moghar-
rabi, Int. Dec. 3028 (BIA 1987).
40. For an early exploration of battered woman's syndrome, see LENORE E.
WALKER, BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). For a discussion of post-traumatic
stress disorder in refugee women, see Adrianne Aron et al., The Gender-Specific Terror
of El Salvador and Guatemala: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Central American Refugee
Women, 14 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 37 (1991). For a general discussion of PTSD, see
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MEDICAL TESTIMONY ON VICTIMS OF TORTURE: A
PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO POLITICAL ASYLUM CASES app. at 8 (1991).
41. See Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028 (BIA 1987).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
43. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 59, 63.
44. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028, at 443 (BIA 1987). See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(a); INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 59, 63. For a brief discussion of the fail-
ure of the BIA and the circuit courts to consistently apply this standard, see Gregory
S. Porter, Note, Persecution Based on Political Opinion: Interpretation of the Refugee Act of
1980, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 243-44 nn.90-93 (1992).
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III. Of Persecution
The United States Refugee Act of 198045 does not provide a definition
of persecution, nor is persecution defined in the regulations implement-
ing the Act. The INS Manual, however, states that persecution has been
defined as "a serious threat to life or freedom on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 4 6 The Manual includes in its definition the statement that
"[s]erious violations of basic human rights can constitute acts of perse-
cution." 4 7 The Manual goes on to state that the conduct alleged to be
persecution must violate a basic human right "protected under international
law." 48 This raises two questions: what is the definition of persecution
under international law, and what are considered to be basic human
rights protected under international law?
Persecution is not defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees 49 or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees. 50 According to well-recognized commentators, this omission of
a precise definition was deliberate to permit a case-by-case determina-
tion of whether any given conduct constitutes persecutory acts. 5 1 The
UNHCR Handbook,52 while acknowledging the lack of a "universal" defi-
nition of persecution, uses the "threat to life or freedom on account of"
one of the five grounds language recited in the INS Manual in discussing
45. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158. The 1980 Act was enacted to bring U.S.
immigration law into compliance with international obligations under the 1967 Pro-
tocol relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded in 1968,
and which incorporates by reference all the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion with the exception of removing the temporal and geographic limitations in the
definition of refugee under the 1951 Convention.
46. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20 (citations omitted). The INS Manual is the
internal guideline drafted by the Department of Justice for the INS to use in inter-
preting U.S. asylum law. Although not legally binding, the INS Manual is a clear
indication of the appropriate standard to be used in evaluating asylum claims. This
definition was taken verbatim from the UNHCR Handbook with the addition of the
word "serious." UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 22, para. 51.
47. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20.
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinaf-
ter Convention].
50. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter
Protocol].
51. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 21 (quoting Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (1983)); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STA-
Tus, 104 (1991) (citing, inter alia, Atle Grahl-Madsen, Identifying the World's Refugees,
467 ANNALS A.A.P.S.S. 11,15 (1983)).
52. The UNHCR Handbook, supra note 22, was drafted by the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees at the request of the High Commissioner's Programme
Executive Committee "for guidance of Governments" in determining refugee status.
Id. at 1. The Handbook has been recognized by U.S. courts, most notably by the
Supreme Court, as "provid[ing] significant guidance in construing the [1967] Proto-
col [Relating to the Status of Refugees], to which Congress sought to conform." INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (citations omitted).
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what could be considered to constitute persecution. 53 The Handbook
further states that "[o]ther serious violations of human rights-for the same
reasons-would also constitute persecution."'54 The Handbook urges a case-
by-case assessment of whether the acts experienced or feared constitute
persecution, fully taking into account the subjective fear of an
applicant. 55
The U.S. judiciary, including the BIA, has tried to meet the chal-
lenge of making case-by-case determinations as to what constitutes per-
secution. In an early case, Kovac v. INS,56 the Ninth Circuit explained
that persecution means what it "ordinarily conveys-the infliction of suf-
fering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opin-
ion) in a way regarded as offensive." In Matter of Acosta, the Board
defined persecution as "the infliction of suffering or harm in order to
punish an individual for possessing a particular belief or characteristic
the persecutor seeks to overcome."'57
Commentators also have interpreted what is contemplated by the
term "persecution," stating that it is a "form of serious harm... includ-
ing either 'specific hostile acts or an accumulation of adverse circum-
stances such as discrimination existing in an atmosphere of insecurity
and fear.' "158 Another commentator has stated that "persecution is also
very much a question of degree and proportion, requiring relation of
the general notion to commonly accepted principles of human rights."5 9
These definitions of persecution share the notion that violations of
basic human rights constitute persecution. It is therefore necessary to
examine what are recognized as basic human rights protected under
international law. Certain human rights are considered so basic, so fun-
damental, as to be nonderogable such that any violation of those rights
is considered egregious. Genocide, slavery, assassination, torture and
53. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 22, para. 51. See supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. para. 52.
56. 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). The case was decided prior to the Refugee
Act of 1980, when the law allowed for withholding of deportation only upon a show-
ing that an individual's life or freedom would be threatened. Withholding of depor-
tation, which still exists as a distinct remedy, is a similar though somewhat less
desirable relief to asylum seekers. This remedy provides for the withholding of
deportation of an individual to a country where that person's "life or freedom would
be threatened." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). The burden of proof required to show a per-
son's life or freedom would be threatened has been held to be higher than that for
showing a well-founded fear of persecution required under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 for asy-
lum, and is determined to be a showing that it is more likely than not, or a clear
probability. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987).
57. Int. Dec. 2986, at 16-17 (BIA 1985).
58. HATHAWAY, supra note 51, at 105 (quoting Deborah Anker & Michael Posner,
The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
9, 67 (1981).
59. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees: The Obligations of States and
the Protection Function of the Office of the UNHCR, MicH. Y.B. INT'L L. STUD. 291, 298
(1980), cited in HATHAWAY, supra note 51.
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arbitrary arrest and detention are among the human rights violations
that are the most widely accepted as prohibited conduct, regardless of
the circumstances and irrespective of the existence of a treaty.
60
Less egregious violations of human rights also are prohibited under
various international human rights documents. For example, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the protection of "'life,
liberty and security of person."'6 1 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also calls for the protection of life, liberty,
and security of person.6 2 The ICCPR prohibits, inter alia, cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment;63 arbitrary or unlawful interference with
privacy, family, and the home; 64 and interference with the right to hold
opinions,6 5 the right to freedom of thought,6 6 the right to freedom of
association, 67 and the right to the equal protection of the law without
any discrimination. 68 Some regional conventions also provide for pro-
tection of security and integrity of the person.6 9
The INS Manual recognizes that human rights violations that are
less than egregious may also amount to persecution. 70 Among the vio-
lations specifically delineated in the Manual are "arbitrary interference
with a person's privacy, family, home, or correspondence; ... enforced
social or civil inactivity; . . . [and] constant surveillance." 7 1
None of these documents directly address gender-based human
rights violations. In fact, there are few human rights documents which
specifically address the particular concerns of women. The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), 7 2 the leading international convenant on this issue, estab-
lishes the right of women to enjoy human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, social, cultural, and civil fields, on an equal basis
60. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
61. Id. art. 3.
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 99 U.N.T.S. 171,
art. 9 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States ratified the ICCPR in September 1992.
63. Id. art. 7.
64. Id. art. 17.
65. Id. art. 19.
66. Id. art. 18.
67. Id. art. 22.
68. Id. art. 26.
69. See, e.g., African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted June
27, 1981, OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 4 (1982) (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986). ("Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and
the integrity of his person."); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, art. 5, at I (entered into force July 18, 1978)
("Every person has the right to have his physical, mental and moral integrity
respected.").
70. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 21.
71. Id.
72. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (1981) (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
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with men. 73 Thus, discrimination against women in all its forms is pro-
hibited.7 4 The issue of whether violence against women is a form of
discrimination is not specifically addressed in the Convention. Recently,
however, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, the body that monitors the implementation of CEDAW by the
signatory parties, has stated that the definition of discrimination against
women in Article 1 of CEDAW "includes gender-based violence." 75
Recent developments in the international human rights theater
have brought the issue of violence against women into sharper focus. 76
International law has been interpreted to protect a woman from violence
perpetrated against her by someone with whom she has or had an inti-
mate relationship, such as marriage. 7 7 Moreover, consistent with this
understanding, there has been an urging by feminists and women's
rights advocates throughout the international human rights community
for the inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to develop effective
means of protection from violence against women in all its forms. IGOs
have begun to respond to these demands. 78
One such response, perhaps the single most significant one to date,
is the groundbreaking Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women (Draft Declaration). 7 9 This Draft Declaration begins by
stating, in its preamble, that it has been drafted as a result of the United
Nations "General Assembly, [r]ecognizing the urgent need for the uni-
versal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to
equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human persons
.... "80 Moreover, the Preamble affirms that "violence against women
both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms .... ."81 The Draft Declaration goes
on to "[r]ecogniz[e] that violence against women is also a manifestation
of historically unequal power relations between men and women .... ,,s2
73. Id. art. 1.
74. Id. art. 2.
75. Violence Against Women, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 1 1th Sess., General Recommendation No. 19, at 1, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992) [hereinafter Violence Against Women]. The main
weakness with both the CEDAW itself and the recent recommendation is that they fail
to characterize violence against women as a human rights violation; rather it is
addressed strictly as an issue of discrimination.
76. See Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9.
77. See, e.g., Copelon, supra note 27; Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley,
Domestic Violenca as a Human Rights Issue, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 36 (1993). See generally infra
notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
79. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of liolence Against Women, U.N. ESCOR, Com-
mission on the Status of Women, Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/WG.2/1992/L.3
(1992) [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. The draft was adopted by the ECOSOC on July
27, 1993, U.M ESCOR, UN. Doc. A/C.3/48/L.5 (1993), and will be voted on for
adoption by the General Assembly in December 1993.
80. Draft Declaration, supra note 79, at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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The Draft Declaration further affirms the findings by ECOSOC in
its Resolution concerning violence against women8 3 that "violence against
women in the family and society is pervasive and cuts across lines of income,
class and culture, and must be matched by urgent and effective steps to elimi-
nate its incidence .... 84 Included in the definitional provisions are pri-
vate as well as public acts of violence, sexual and psychological harm,
and threats of harm or suffering, including "coercion or arbitrary depri-
vations of liberty" as well as physical harm.8 5 Article 3 declares that
"[wiomen are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field."8 6
Article 4 of the Draft Declaration delineates the obligations of the
states to develop enforceable laws and appropriate sanctions, and to be
vigilant in their efforts to prevent violence against women from occur-
ring, to fully investigate any reported acts of violence against women,
and to punish those acts to the full extent of the law, whether perpe-
trated by the state or by private individuals. 8
7
Another important act by the IGOs is the Draft Resolution on Dis-
crimination Against Women, 88 recently adopted by the Subcommission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the
83. Report on the Thirty-Fourth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on the Status of
Women, at 4-5, 26, Supp. No. 5, concerning violence against women in the family
and society, as adopted by the ECOSOC Resolution 1990/25, May 24, 1990, which
concluded that violence against women is pervasive and calls for immediate action on
the part of governments and non-government organizations to address the issue of
violence against women. U.N. Doc. E/1990/25, E/CN6/1990/11 (1990), E.S.C. Res.
1990/25, U.N. ESCOR (May 24, 1990).
84. Draft Declaration, supra note 79, at 5 (emphasis added). After explicitly
acknowledging the important role women's movements throughout the world have
played in bringing attention to this critical issue of violence against women in all its
forms, the Preamble of the Draft Declaration ends by stating, as its four-pronged
purpose, the
need for (a) a clear and comprehensive definition of violence against women;
(b) a clear statement of the rights to be applied to ensure the eradication of
violence against women in all its forms; (c) a commitment by States in respect
of their responsibilities; and (d) a commitment by the international commu-
nity towards the eradication of violence against women ....
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added). Article 3 goes on to delineate the protected rights as
the rights to life; equality; liberty and security of person; equal protection under the
law; freedom from all forms of discrimination; the highest standard attainable of
physical and mental health; just and favorable conditions of work; and the right not
to be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. Id.
87. See, e.g., id. art. 4 (b), (c), (d), (j), and (o), at 6-7. Article 5 of the Draft Decla-
ration deals with the roles, responsibilities and interactions of agencies within the
United Nations itself to further the elimination of violence against women. Article 6
states that this Declaration shall not serve to undercut any existing, more effective, or
powerful or authoritative provisions concerning the eradication of violence against
women. Id. arts. 5, 6, at 8.
88. Draft Resolution on Discrimination Against W1omen, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
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Commission on Human Rights. 89 This Draft Resolution recommends
that women's rights be recognized as human rights by all U.N. bodies,
including the Commission on Human Rights.90
The Preliminary Draft for the Preparation of an Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
Against Women,91 if enacted, will be the first international human rights
convention that proscribes violence against women, specifically includ-
ing intimate violence, as being violative of human rights. It includes
both public and private acts within the scope of its protection.9 2 It rec-
ognizes that freedom from gender-based violence "can only be achieved
if conditions are created whereby women and men equally enjoy and
exercise the human rights enunciated in the international and regional
legal instruments, such as the Additional Protocol to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights in the Areas of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights."193 The draft convention imposes duties on state parties to
"pursue... a policy to prevent, punish, and eradicate said violence," 94
and calls for state accountability for failure to take such steps, including
the provision of mechanisms to monitor and report on compliance with
the Convention. 95
At the same time that these efforts are being made on the inter-
governmental level, non-governmental international human rights
groups have begun focusing their attention on gender-based human
rights abuses perpetrated against women.96 In documenting these vio-
Minorities, Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National,
Regional and International Levels, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/L.7 (1992).
89. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights is the U.N. body chiefly responsible
for addressing issues of human rights violations, proposing measures to prevent and
punish such violations, and monitoring for abuses and failures to comply with appli-
cable international human rights documents. U.N. Charter art. 68, amended 24 U.S.T.
2225.
90. "The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities ...
[r]ecommends that women 's rights be recognized as human rights and that they be treated
as such in all United Nations bodies, including the Commission on Human Rights." Draft
Resolution on Discrimination Against Women, supra note 88 (emphasis added).
91. Report on the Results of the Meeting of Experts to Consider the l'iability of an Inter-
American Convention on Women and Violence, OEA/Ser.L/ii.7.4, CIM/doc., 1/91 (1991).
92. Id. at 17-18.
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 19-23.
96. In one of the first comprehensive human rights reports to address domestic
violence as a violation of international human rights, the Women's Rights Project
and Americas Watch, both of Human Rights Watch, evaluated the Brazilian legal
system's response to violence against women and found serious inadequacies in the
treatment of cases of wife-murder, batter', and rape, as well as discriminatory prac-
tices in investigating and prosecuting cases of violence. The report showed that, as a
result of a combination of factors, and despite a rise in its occurrence, perpetrators of
domestic violence, including wife-murder, are allowed to act with virtual impunity.
The report denounced the Brazilian government for failing to meet its international
obligations under the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and called upon the
government to take specific steps to bring its treatment of intimate violence into con-
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lations, they have both called attention to their occurrence and have
served to help bring the issues into the discourse on international
human rights. These combined efforts lead to the clear conclusion that
international law as well as the inter-governmental and non-governmen-
tal human rights communities all recognize a range of conduct as being
violative of a woman's human rights, including violence against women.
As such, these violations constitute persecution.
At the far end of the spectrum, torture and cruel and inhuman treat-
ment are virtually always considered acts of persecution.9 7 By any stan-
dard, persecution must include these most universally criticized human
rights violations. Some feminists argue that at least the more egregious
acts of intimate violence meet the international definition of torture and
should be regarded as such.98 Yet torture is not a necessary component
of persecution.
Even if one accepts the view that acts of intimate violence do not
rise to the level of egregious human rights violations, as discussed
above, there is strong support for the view that intimate violence is a
serious human rights violation warranting state protection. As such, a
state's failure to protect a woman from this violation constitutes a
breach of its duties. 99
Intimate violence includes conduct such as taking the life of a
woman, physical and mental harm, forcing a woman to perform sexual
or other acts against her will, confining a woman to the home, and
repeated verbal and emotional abuse.1 00 At a minimum, any of this con-
duct, virtually de facto, constitutes serious violations of internationally
recognized human rights. At the same time, it can be argued that the
acquiescence of the state in the perpetration of these acts itself raises the
physical and emotional torment of a battered woman to the level of
human rights violations and, as such, constitutes persecution.' 0 1 The
international recognition of intimate violence as a human rights viola-
tion strongly supports the argument that these acts of violence consti-
formity with its obligations under international law. See AMERICAS WATCH &
WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN BRAZIL (1991) [hereinafter BRAZIL REPORT].
97. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified 24
I.L.M. 535 (1985) (entered into forceJune 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]. This Con-
vention defines torture as any mental or physical pain inflicted with the consent or
acquiescence of public officials. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 21; UDHR, supra note
60; ICCPR, supra note 62; American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (entered into
force July 18, 1978).
98. For a full discussion of the argument that at least some of the kinds of acts
perpetrated in the context of intimate violence constitute torture, see Copelon, supra
note 27; Stairs & Pope, supra note 20, at 176 (quoting Biderman's Chart of Coercion
(citations omitted)).
99. See infra Part V for a discussion of state liability for private acts.
100. See supra notes 1, 3 and 8 and accompanying text.
101. See CAT, supra note 97, art. I.
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tute persecution in the asylum law context, and that protection from
these violations must be recognized under U.S. asylum law.
Significantly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugess (UNHCR)
also has begun to turn its attention toward the particular needs of
women as refugees and as claimants for refugee and asylum status. In
its 1991 Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, the UNHCR
calls for recognition of gender-based human rights violations, including
severe discrimination, as persecution under the Refugee Convention. 10
2
Canada has recently promulgated Guidelines on Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, a document that recog-
nizes gender-based violence and related conduct as constituting acts of
persecution for the purposes of granting refugee status. l0 3 These
recent advances not only support the argument that intimate violence be
recognized under U.S. law as a basis for granting asylum. They directly
address the issue and call for acceptance of these claims under the law.
IV. By the State or a Force that State is Unwilling or Unable to Control
A person seeking to establish eligibility for asylum must show more than
that he or she has suffered or has a well-founded fear of suffering perse-
cution. The persecution must be at the hands of the state or a force that
the state either cannot or will not control.' 04 Thus, it is not sufficient to
show that intimate violence rises to the level of persecution; state liabil-
ity for the perpetration of such violence must be shown as well. Since
acts of intimate violence are almost always committed by private actors,
one must determine whether the state is liable for the acts of private
individuals which violate protected human rights, and if so, when.
The state must be held liable for human rights violations committed
by private actors. State liability may be found where the state refuses or
is unable to provide protection or redress from such abuses. 10 5 Interna-
tional law imposes a standard of due diligence or reasonable care on the
state to prevent, investigate, and punish individuals, even non-state
actors, who have committed acts that constitute human rights viola-
102. Information Note on UNHCR's Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee JI'omen, U.N.
High Comm'r for Refugees, 42d Sess., paras. 54-60, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991)
[hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines]. For a discussion of the 1991 Guidelines, see infra
Part V.
103. CHAIRPERSON, CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ON
WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER RELATED PERSECUTION (1993) [herein-
after CANADA GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines were issued pursuant to section 65(3) of
the Immigration Act. For a discussion of these guidelines, see infra Part V.
104. See, e.g., McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981); accord, INS
MANUAL, supra note 14, at 25.
105. See generally Gordon Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 312 (1991); Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public IW'rongs, and the
Responsibility of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1989-90); Donna Sullivan, Violence
Against Women: The Legal Framework, Presentation to the International League
for Human Rights and International Women's Rights Action Watch Conference enti-
tled "Combatting Violence Against Women" (Jan. 17, 1992) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
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tions. 106 The failure of the state to do so is a breach of its duties, and as
such implicates the state in the commission of these human rights viola-
tions. Such a breach of duty could be found where, for example, there is
a repeated failure of the criminal justice system to provide protection to
victims of intimate violence,10 7 or where social custom dictates such
abuse as an acceptable practice and there are no viable means of legal
recourse to prevent, investigate, or punish such acts.108
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) requires the state to provide protection from
the conduct of private actors,10 9 as do other international conventions
that address specific rights of women. 110 Those conventions that
address conduct towards women explicitly articulate an obligation on
the part of the state to protect against the conduct of private actors.
Additionally, as discussed above in Part III, recent international human
rights documents, proposed as well as enacted, addressing violence
against women in general and intimate violence in particular, call for
state protection against private conduct. lI
For those states that have ratified CEDAW, t1 2 the committee that
oversees implementation of the Convention has stated that as gender-
based violence impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or
under specific human rights conventions, it is discrimination and there-
fore prohibited by the Convention.'1 3 The Committee, noting that
"[s]tates may... be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with
due diligence to prevent violations of rights, or to investigate and pun-
ish acts of violence," 1 1 4 found that domestic violence may interfere with
fundamental rights and freedoms, including the "right not to be subject
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment .... the right to
liberty and security of person, [and] the right to the equal protection of
106. VELASOUEz-RODRIGUEZ CASE, supra note 29; CEDAW, supra note 72; see also
infra notes 109, 115 and accompanying text; supra note 105.
107. See, e.g., BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 96.
108. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 105.
109. CEDAW, supra note 72, art. 2.
110. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (1949)
(entered into force July 25, 1951).
111. See supra notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
112. CEDAW, supra note 72. Article 1 of CEDAW defines discrimination against
women as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exer-
cise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil, or any other field. Id. Many states, including the United States, have
failed to ratify or have done so with reservations. See RebeccaJ. Cook, Reservations to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J.
INT'L L. 643, 644 (1990).
113. Violence Against Women, supra note 75.
114. Id. para. 10.
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the law."''115
At least two international human rights courts have interpreted
human rights conventions to confer state liability for private conduct
where the state has failed to uphold its affirmative obligations to protect
the rights delineated in the conventions in question. The courts also
found that the state failed to establish adequate legal protections against
such violations and to make good faith efforts to investigate them, to
punish those responsible for the acts, and to compensate the victims. 1 16
Furthermore, at least one commentator has found an affirmative obliga-
tion on the part of the state to guarantee the rights delineated in the
ICCPR, stating that "as regards some rights in some circumstances, it
may perhaps require the state to adopt laws and other measures against
private interference with enjoyment of rights .... ,, 17
Human rights monitoring organizations, in recent efforts to docu-
ment gender-based human rights violations, have also criticized the fail-
ure of governments to protect women from non-governmental actors,
such as family members and employers. Is In addition to reporting on
such abuses, these organizations also are calling for the adoption of
practices to ensure the protection of women's human rights, including
the ratification of international legal instruments which would specifi-
cally provide for such protection and would hold states accountable for
breaches.119
Although there is no universally accepted definition of persecution
in the context of refugee and asylum law, there is agreement that perse-
cution takes the form not only of direct government action but of gov-
115. Id. para. 8.
116. Sullivan, supra note 105, at 21 (citing X and Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1985) (finding state liability for private acts of sexual assault by a non-state
actor under the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms); and VELASQUEz-RODRIGUEZ CASE, supra note 29, (finding
that the disappearance of Honduran citizens was attributable to individuals "who
acted under cover of public authority," and stating that even absent proof of state
complicity in the acts, failure to act "is a failure on the part of Honduras to fulfill the
duties it assumed under Article 1(1) of the [American] Convention [on Human
Rights], regardless of the illegality of the conduct, lack of government awareness of it
or official orders to commit it.").
117. Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Pemissible Der-
ogations, in Louis HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 77-78 (1971) (citations omitted).
118. See, e.g., BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 96; WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH & ASIA WATCH, DOUBLEJEOPARDY: POLICE ABUSE OF WOMEN IN PAKI-
STAN (1992); WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & MIDDLE EAST
WATCH, PUNISHING THE VICTIM: RAPE AND MISTREATMENT OF ASIAN MAIDS IN KUWAIT
(1992); WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & HELSINKI WATCH,
HIDDEN VICTIMS: WOMEN IN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND (1992).
119. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINE (calling for the
ratification and enforcement on behalf of women of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the U.N. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
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emmental inaction as well. The UNHCR Handbook notes that seemingly
private acts of violence "can be considered persecution if they are know-
ingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove
unable, to offer effective protection."1 20 Further, where a petitioner's
country has denied her protection, "[s]uch denial of protection may
confirm or strengthen the applicant's fear of persecution and may
indeed be an element of persecution."' 12 ' This is consistent with the
Convention drafters' determination that "rather than supplanting
domestic responsibility for human rights, the purpose of the Refugee
Convention was to assist only persons who lacked the protection of a
government,"' 12 2 and their "fundamental preoccupation to identify
forms of harm demonstrative of a breach by a state of its basic obliga-
tions of protection."' 123
Commentators consistently have stated that "persecution [arises]
not only from a conscious intent to harm (malfeasance) but also from
misfeasance or nonfeasance"' 124 and that persecution includes "failure,
voluntary or involuntary, on the part of the state authorities to prevent
or suppress [private] violence."' 25
Significantly, the recently enacted UNHCR Guidelines on the Pro-
tection of Refugee Women call upon states to recognize gender-based
persecution, including those acts which occur in the private sphere, such
as rape and domestic violence, where it occurs with the "consent or
acquiescence of those acting in an official capacity to intimate or to pun-
ish" or "where a government cannot or will not protect women... [rec-
ognizing that] the government need not itself have been the instigator of
the abuse."'126 Canada has also recognized state liability for private
actions:
[a] sub-group of women can be identified by reference to the fact of their
exposure or vulnerability for physical, cultural or other reasons, to vio-
lence, including domestic violence, in an environment that denies them
protection. These women face violence amounting to persecution
because of their particular vulnerability as women in their societies and
because they are so unprotected. 127
The INS Manual 128 states that a person is a refugee for purposes of
asylum eligibility if "he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution (as
120. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 22, para. 65.
121. Id. para. 98; accord INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 18.
122. HATHAWAY, supra note 51, at 133.
123. DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (1991).
124. S. Young, Who is a Refugee? A Theory of Persecution, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE
ALIEN 38, 45 (1982).
125. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees: The Obligation of States and the
Protection Function of the UNHCR, 1982 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L L. STUDIES 291, 298-99
(1982).
126. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 102, para. 71.
127. CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at 6 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
128. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 25.
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a result of one of the five factors in the definition) because he or she is not
adequately protected by his or her government." 1 29 This is consistent with
court intepretations of persecution by actors that the state either cannot
or will not control,1 30 and clearly establishes asylum eligibility for indi-
viduals fleeing actual persecution or having a well-founded fear of future
persecutory acts committed by private actors.
Where a government imposes no criminal sanctions for any but the
most heinous or lethal assaults by men on female intimates, or when it
systematically refuses to afford women the protections that exist under
the law, it is abandoning its function of protecting women from the vio-
lent assaults of their male intimates. This failure on the part of the state
to impose penal sanctions for the physical and mental abuse of women
by male intimates brings intimate violence into the arena of human
rights violations. As such, these failures are acts of persecution, accom-
plished with the acquiescence, if not overt complicity, of the state.
In refusing to protect a woman from the assaults of her husband or
other male intimate, the state fails to honor its obligations under inter-
national law to protect her basic human rights, and thus has persecuted
her. This failure to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prose-
cute, and punish such human rights violations equally implicates the
state, whether it is through a failure to protect an individual woman, a
systematic denial of protection, or a failure to apply and enforce existing
laws to women who are battered by their male intimates.
Where a woman who has been the target of intimate violence has
either sought and been refused state protection, or where no such pro-
tection exists-either in fact or in practice, making it futile to seek it-
the state becomes complicitous in those acts of persecution. Thus, a
state has persecuted a woman where it has not provided her protection
from her husband or other male intimate's acts of violence-whether it
is through active denial of protection or through failure of the system to
offer protection for such violent acts.
V. On Account of One of the Five Enumerated Grounds
Feminist scholars and advocates have criticized the 1951 Convention,
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and U.S. asylum
law for their failure to recognize gender as a category upon which a well-
founded fear of persecution may be based. Similarly, they have criti-
cized the failure of asylum law adjudicators to incorporaie the gender-
based persecution claims of women into one of the existing enumerated
grounds. 13 1 At least partially in response to these criticisms, the
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981); accord INS MAN-
UAL, supra note 14, at 25.
131. See Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Dis-
course, 1 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 518 (1989); Stairs & Pope, supra note 20; Neal, supra note
12; Kronenberger, supra note 20, at 61; Jacqueline R. Castel, Rape, SexualAssault and
the Aeaning of Persecution, 4 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 39 (1992).
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UNHCR has begun to turn its attention to matters of gender-based
persecution.
In 1985 the Executive Committee (EC) of the UNHCR passed its
first conclusion specifically addressing women refugees and asylum
applicants.' 3 2 In that conclusion, the EC acknowledges that refugee
women and girls are often in a "vulnerable situation which frequently
exposes them to physical violence, sexual abuse and discrimination,"
that there is a need for greater understanding of the circumstances they
face,' 3 3 and that states may recognize gender-based persecution claims
of women seeking refugee status.1 3 4
In 1991 the UNHCR adopted Guidelines on the Protection of Refu-
gee Women.13 5 These Guidelines address issues concerning women as
refugees as well as issues pertinent to women seeking refugee and asy-
lum status. The Guidelines confirm the existence of gender-based per-
secution and encourage states to recognize claims for asylum and
refugee status of women fleeing gender-based persecution.' 3 6
Over the past several years Canada has been steadily and, until
recently, quietly making inroads into recognition of gender-based perse-
cution claims under its asylum and refugee law. The most significant
change is the Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gen-
der-Related Persecution issued on March 9, 1993.137 These guidelines
reflect a comprehensive understanding of gender-based persecution
claims and make a range of recommendations for effectively evaluating
and accepting such claims. In addition, Canada also has begun recog-
nizing gender-based persecution claims, including those of women flee-
ing intimate violence in recent asylum claim determinations.13 8
Unfortunately, there is no correlative effort in the United States by the
INS or the courts to pay particular attention to gender-based persecu-
tion claims.' 3 9 Barring gender as a category, there are still two lines of
argument for establishing that the well-founded fear is on account of
one of the five enumerated grounds when a woman is fleeing intimate
violence: that the persecution would be on account of her membership
in a particular social group, or on account of her political opinion.
132. Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI), Refugee Women and International Protection, U.N. Doc.
HRC/IP/2/Rev. 1986, (July 8, 1985). A similar resolution was adopted by the Euro-
pean Parliament in 1984. See Stairs & Pope, supra note 20, at 167.
133. Conclusion No. 39, supra note 132, para. (d).
134. Id., para. (k).
135. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 102.
136. Id., para. 54.
137. CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 103.
138. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
139. The Canada Guidelines serve as a model and should be considered carefully by
the INS and advocates in pushing for similar recognition and protection of women
fleeing gender-based persecution in the United States.
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A. Membership in a Particular Social Group
As discussed above, gender is not one of the enumerated bases on
account of which one could establish a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.1 40 For women making claims of a well-founded fear of persecution
as a result of intimate violence, finding a categorical basis for the perse-
cution is a significant hurdle.' 4 ' In the absence of the explicit recogni-
tion of gender-based violence as a basis in and of itself, one approach is
to argue that a woman whose well-founded fear of persecution is due to
intimate violence is a member of a particular social group.14 2
The 'particular social group' category was added to the other
grounds for obtaining refugee status-race, religion, nationality, and
political opinion-by the Swedish delegation to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees in recognition of the potential failure
of the other four categories to include "all the reasons for persecution
an imaginative despot could conjure up."' 4 3 The Office of the United
Nation High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Cri-
teria for Determining Refugee Status (UNHCR Handbook), in the merest inter-
pretation, offers only that a particular social group "normally comprises
persons of similar background, habits, or social status." 14 4
The pre-eminent scholar on international refugee law, Atle Grahl-
Madsen, is among those who have commented on the meaning of the
term "social group" contained in the Refugee Convention. He pro-
pounds that the social group category is meant to be broader than the
other categories and that, in fact, it was added to the Convention defini-
tion to protect against persecution that would arise from unforseeable
circumstances.1 4 5 Another commentator has asserted that the social
group concept "possesses an element of open-endedness which states,
in their discretion, could expand in favour of a variety of different
140. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141. Implicit in the notion of persecution "on account of" one of the five grounds
is an element of precipitating conduct. For example, it is on account of someone's
action, participation, or membership that she is at risk of persecution. In the case of
battering, it is widely accepted that it is not what a woman does or does not do that
causes or provokes the violence. Rather, the battering is virtually always without any
meaningful relationship to what she does or does not do. Thus, it is only in the
specific context of meeting the requirements for asylum or refugee status that we
must examine battering as being "on account of" a particular ground.
142. 8 U.S.C § I 101(a)(42). For a discussion of the use of the social group cate-
gory as a basis for making gender-based claims of persecution generally, see Nancy
Kelly, infra. For an in-depth discussion of the historical background and current
interpretations of the social group category under the Refugee Convention as well as
under 1980 Refugee Act, see Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status
Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
505 (1993).
143. Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis
for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 39 (1983). For a critique of Helton's
analysis, see Fullerton, supra note 142.
144. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 22, para. 77.
145. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, I THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
(1966).
Vol 26
1993 Anyplace but Home
classes susceptible to persecution."' 4 6
Notably, leading commentator James Hathaway asserts unequivo-
cally that gender, though not one of the five Convention grounds for
protection, "is properly within the ambit of the social group cate-
gory."' 14 7 He further states that "[giender-based groups are clear exam-
ples of social subsets defined by an innate and immutable
characteristic."'14 8 He concludes his comments on gender as a social
group category by refuting the criticism that "gender-defined social
groups" constitute too broad a spectrum; "adherence to the ejusdem
generis principle defeats such concerns, since race, nationality, religion,
and even political opinion are also traits which are shared by large num-
bers of people."' 49
The Refugee Act of 1980 offers no guidance as to what constitutes a
particular social group, nor do the implementing regulations discuss the
term. The legislative history of the Act is also silent on the inclusion of
this particular term. Commentators on the U.S. statute have argued for
an expansive interpretation of the social group category.' 50 At least
some of these commentators take the position that a study of the travaux
preparatoires of the Convention and Protocol upon which the Refugee Act
is based, supports the view that the social group category was meant to
be a kind of catch-all category to protect those legitimately fearing per-
secution but unable to fit their claims into one of the other four
grounds. 151
146. Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1983). He
goes on to state that in efforts to convince state signatories to the convention to
adopt a broad interpretation of social group, one could point to "the unifying factors
of the group in question and to the elements of distinction which make it the object
of persecution." Id. at 30-31. This comment is footnoted with a suggestion that it
might be possible, under some circumstances, to call for the recognition of "discrimi-
nation suffered by women.., on account of their sex alone" as a social group. Id. at
31 n.46.
147. HATHAWAY, supra note 51, at 162 (citing D. Indra, Gender: A Key Dimension of the
Refugee Experience 62 REFUGEE 3 (1987); and Greatbatch, supra note 131).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 163 (citations omitted). According to the dictionary, eusdem generis sig-
nifies "of the same kind" and means, in statutory construction, that "where general
words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will
be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumer-
ated." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). See also GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note
145, at 213 (asserting that "[o]nce a person is subjected to a measure of such gravity
that we consider it 'persecution,' that person is 'persecuted' in the sense of the Con-
vention irrespective of how many others are subjected to the same or similar
measures").
150. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 143; Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration:
Social Groups and Political Asylum Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 740 (1989); Daniel
Compton, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly 4jar-Sanchez-
Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 913, 1987. See also
Neal, supra note 12.
151. See Helton, supra note 143; Neal, supra note 12; Compton, supra note 150.
Compton states that the Convention and Protocol travaux preparatoires indicate that
the social group category "was meant to insure that groups of individuals who shared
common social characteristics and might be the target of persecution, but did not fit
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Despite the apparent inclusiveness of the term, there has been little
agreement in United States courts on how "'particular social groups" are
to be recognized or defined. Although there have been few cases
decided by either the BIA or the circuit courts dealing with the interpre-
tation of the social group category, the courts generally have been reluc-
tant to broadly define membership in a particular social group and have
recognized few proposed social groups as meeting the statutory require-
ment. At the same time, although the courts generally have agreed that
the members of a particular social group must share some "common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that
discrete social group"1 52 that is "recognizable and discrete"1 l5 3 and
"which [serves] to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor,"' 54 the
cases reveal a lack of cohesive definition as to what may constitute a
particular social group. Despite this general lack of clarity and unwill-
ingness, there is dicta supporting the view that the potential remains for
a broader interpretation of this ground. 15 5
In Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 1 56 the first appellate court case to deal
with the issue of defining what constitutes a particular social group, the
First Circuit found that membership in a particular social group pro-
vided a basis for withholding deportation when members of the group
shared and were persecuted for "characteristics that are essentially
beyond the petitioner's power to change."'' 57 This is the only case in
which the circuit court found the proposed social group cognizable
under the Act. The petitioner was a Ghanaian woman whose father had
political ties with the party that recently had been overthrown by a coup
d'etat, and was also an educated professional and a member of the
Ashanti tribe. Ms. Ananeh-Firempong argued that all three social
groups were subject to persecution by the ruling government, and that
based on her familial relationship, she also was a member of each of
these particular social groups. 158
into classifications such as race, religion, or political opinion, would not be left
unprotected." Id. at 939.
152. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
153. Saleh v. INS, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1992).
154. Gomez v. INS, 947 F. 2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
155. See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664; Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. See also Cas-
tenada-Hernandez v. INS, 826 F.2d 1526 (6th Cir. 1987) (remanding on other
grounds while leaving open the possibility that the social group of young men who
are not and have not been members of the military and as such are presumed to be
subversive may be recognized under the statute). For a discussion on this point, see
Graves, supra note 150, at 774-75.
156. 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
157. Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 626. In this case, the appellant was applying for
withholding of deportation under INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). See supra note
56 for an explanation of § 243(h) relief, its distinction from asylum under § 208, and
the difference in the burden of proof for sustaining a claim under § 243(h).
158. Id. In addition to the assertion that these groups were subject to persecution,
petitioner supported her claim with details of specific incidents, such as the house
arrest of her parents and confiscation of the family bank account, along with docu-
mentation generally supporting that the various groups, Ashanti tribespeople, mem-
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The court did not specify which of the three social groups it was
recognizing, although by implication it recognized all three. The court
simply, and with virtually no discussion other than to quote the relevant
sections on particular social group in the UNHCR Handbook, ruled that
the facts as petitioner described them brought her "squarely within this
definition [of membership in a particular social group as stated in
paragraphs 77-78 of the UNHCR Handbook]."' 5 9
The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting as a particular social group "young,
urban, working class males of military age who have never served in the
military or otherwise expressed support for the government,"' 60 set out
a four-part test to determine when membership in a particular social
group may form the basis of an asylum claim. First, the court ruled, it
must be decided whether the class suggested is "cognizable as a 'partic-
ular social group' under the immigration statutes."' 16 Second, it must
be established that the petitioner is a member of the particular social
group suggested. Third, it should be determined whether the suggested
social group has been targeted for persecution on account of the charac-
teristics of the group. Finally, the existence of "special circumstances"
should be alleged, which would allow for membership in the group to
establish eligibility for asylum.' 62
In dicta, the Ninth Circuit did make a significant recognition. The
court stated that it "may agree that the 'social group' category is a flexi-
ble one which extends broadly to encompass many groups who do not
bers of the former ruling party, and well-educated people were subject to
persecution.
159. Id.
160. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1986).
161. Id. at 1574.
162. Id. In the first prong of the test, the court clearly is begging the question
when it states that the social group must be cognizable under immigration law. Cit-
ing to the definition of a refugee under INA § 101(a)(42), that section of the statute
which mirrors the international definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol, does nothing to explain what constitutes a particular social group
or even what standard or criteria must be followed in determining whether the indi-
vidual has satisfied that requirements of that category.
In addition, although the "special circumstances" language also comes directly out
of the UNHCR Handbook, neither the Handbook nor the court offer any explanation as
to what would constitute special circumstances, nor of how they would be identified
or measured. More importantly, the Handbook calls for a showing of special circum-
stances only when the claim is based on "[m]ere membership of [sic] a particular
social group" alone without more. The court does not add that qualification, thus
implying that in all instances "special circumstances" must be shown, and thereby
over-stepping the bounds of the souce upon which it is relying. UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 22, at para. 79.
A further complication of the Ninth's Circuit decision in this case is its addition of
language that the identification with the group must be volitional-this after reaffirm-
ing that the characteristics identifying the group must be immutable or of such signif-
icance to one's conscience and self-identity that an individual should not be required
to change it. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575. While the latter are generally voli-
tional, at least initially, the former are, almost by definition, rarely voluntary. For a
discussion on the problems and issues raised by this case, see, e.g., Graves, supra note
150; Fullerton, supra note 142.
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otherwise fall within the other categories of race, nationality, religion, or
political opinion."' 163 This statement is consistent with the interpreta-
tions of scholars and other commentators that the purpose of the social
group ground was to encompass those who truly had a well-founded
fear of persecution but were unable to fit themselves into one of the
other more specifically defined categories. As such, the court is
acknowledging the importance of interpreting the category expansively
to offer protection for those with a reasonable possibility of suffering
persecution who would otherwise go unprotected.
The Board of Immigration Appeals, in its leading case of social
group, Matter of Acosta, used the concept of e'usdem generis to interpret the
term "particular social group" in a manner it believed to be consistent
with the other four bases for obtaining refugee status. 16 4 Noting that
each of the other four categories described "persecution aimed at an
immutable characteristic," the Board interpreted the phrase "persecu-
tion on account of membership in a particular social group" to mean
"persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a
group of persons all of whom share a common immutable characteris-
tic .... [The characteristic] must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change or should not be required to change."' 16 5
This test, which pre-dates the one enunciated by the Ninth Circuit
in Sanchez-Trujillo and is binding on all immigration courts sitting in any
region where the circuit court has not ruled to the contrary, 166 is at odds
with the Ninth Circuit test, which calls for volitional association as a piv-
otal element in establishing membership in the social group. 167 Both
the BIA test and the Sanchez-Trujillo test have been vigorously critiqued
by comentators.' 68
The Second Circuit, in the only reported circuit court case of its
kind, has confirmed that a particular social group may provide a valid
basis for an asylum claim where the fear is of gender-based violence. In
Gomez v. INS, 1 6 9 the court denied the claim of a petitioner whose appli-
cation for asylum was premised on her membership in the particular
social group of young Salvadoran women who have "previously been
brutalized by Salvadoran guerrillas .... " The court, while acknowledg-
ing the "physical and emotional pain that has been wantonly inflicted
163. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. The court went on to state that the "scope
of the term cannot be without some outer limit." Id.
164. Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
165. Id. at 233.
166. See generally DAVID A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAw 8-9 (1987).
167. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
168. See supra note 150. In particular, Graves gives a detailed and thorough discus-
sion of the failings of these two decisions and offers as an alternative to a comprehen-
sive definition of social group a case by case analysis of whether the individual
member of a proposed social group can show a well-founded fear of persecution
which would entail "careful assessment and resolution of individual claims of perse-
cution in accordance with our international obligations." Graves, supra note 150, at
742.
169. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
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[on her]," denied her claim, finding she had been unable to demonstrate
that she was "more likely to be persecuted than any other young
woman" and concluded that she did not support her claim of a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five grounds.
170
The court explicitly stated that its decision "[did] not suggest that
women who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by par-
ticular attackers" could not successfully establish eligibility for asylum as
members of a particular social group. 17 1 The court went on to state,
however, that "[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as
youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership
in a particular social group."' 72 Thus, while the circuit court explicitly
addressed gender as a social group category, it stated, in dictum, that
absent other unspecified qualifying attributes, gender would not suffice.
It is important to note that this case does not pose the argument
that gender, per se, is the social group; rather the social group is defined
as "women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran
guerillas."'173 Moreover, other than a recitation of several circuit court
cases, the court did minimal analysis of gender-based persecution. The
dictum occurs then in the context of having no presentation of the argu-
ment of gender as a social group before it, without an in-depth analysis
of the issue, and without the benefit of reference to the international
documents and other recent developments in this area.
Despite the language of the court in Gomez, there is support for the
argument that gender be recognized as a particular social group and it is
within that group that battered women would be protected. Alterna-
tively, the social group of women who have been battered by a male
intimate and are unable to obtain protection from the state constitutes a
narrower rendering of a social group and so might more readily meet
the requirements for establishing a social group.'
74
The UNHCR Executive Committee's 1985 Conclusion on Refugee
Women confirms that states may recognize claims of gender-based per-
170. Id. at 664. This is a misstatement of the standard. The requirement of show-
ing an individual will be singled out for persecution has long been abandoned pursu-
ant to the 1987 Supreme Court decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987), and this change has been incorporated into the regulations and the INS Man-
ual. Furthermore, an asylum applicant does not have the burden of showing that it is
more likely than not she will be persecuted, nor that she is more likely to be perse-
cuted than any one else. She must show, rather, that she has a reasonable possibility
of being persecuted on account of one of the five grounds. See supra notes 34-39 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the standard for an asylum claim.
171. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 663-64.
174. Another way to define the social group is to describe it as consisting of those
women whose refusal to submit to the domination of a legal or common union hus-
band or other male intimate has resulted in repeated life-threatening assaults despite
their efforts to obtain protection from state authorities. This is the way that the social
group has been defined in the case of Nora, described above, which is pending in the
Immigration Court in New York City. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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secution under the particular social group category. 175 The UNHCR
Guidelines on Refugee Women call for states to "[p]romote acceptance in the
asylum adjudication process of the principle that women fearing perse-
cution or severe discrimination on the basis of their gender should be
considered a member of a social group for the purposes of determining
refugee status." 176
The Canadian guidelines address the social group category by
acknowledging that there is "increasing international support for the
application of the particular social group ground to the claims of women
who allege a fear of persecution solely by reasons of their gender."' 77
The guidelines provide that the size of the social group is irrelevant to a
determination. The only relevant consideration is whether the group
"suffers or fears to suffer severe discrimination or harsh and inhuman
treatment that is distinguished from the situation of the general popula-
tion, or from other women." 17 8
Recent Canadian case law supports the argument that claims of
women fleeing intimate violence can be assessed under the social group
category. In one of the first cases of its kind, the Federal Court of
Appeal found in Mayers v. ME.. that a woman fleeing intimate violence
based on her membership in the particular social group of "Trinidadian
women subject to wife abuse" had established a "credible basis" for
allowing her claim to be adjudicated on the merits. 179
A second case, relying in part on the decision in Mayers also
addresses the issue of intimate violence and the social group cate-
175. Conclusion No. 39, supra note 132, para. (k). The text reads:
[S]tates, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpreta-
tion that women asylum-seekers who face harsh and inhuman treatment due
to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live
may be considered as a "particular social group"; within the meaning of Arti-
cle IA(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.
Since the 1985 Resolution, Pierre Bertrand, Chief of the General Legal Advice Sec-
tion, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, in response to a panel on gender-
based persecution claims, stated that he believed the language of the recommenda-
tion is not strong enough to adequately meet the needs of women refugee and asy-
lum claimants, and that he was prepared to address the issue of gender-based
persecution claims by women in the coming period. Pierre Bertrand, Remarks at the
Cornell International Law Journal Symposium (Feb. 21, 1993).
176. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 102, para. 71.
177. Id. at 5 (citing Conclusion No. 39, supra note 132).
178. Id. at 6. The guidelines continue by providing that:
a sub-group of women can be identified by reference to the fact of their expo-
sure or vulnerability for physical, cultural or other reasons, to violence,
including domestic violence, in an environment that denies them protection
.... These women face violence amounting to persecution because of their
particular vulnerability as women in their societies and because they are so unpro-
tected (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
179. Mayers v. M.E.I. (F.C.A. No. A-544-92), Nov. 5, 1992. The court was review-
ing a decision by the Refugee Division that the applicant had established a sufficient
legal basis to allow her case to proceed on the merits. This "credible basis" finding
only assesses whether a claimant has made the U.S. equivalent of a non-frivolous
claim, but does not rule on the merits of the claim itself.
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gory.1 80 In that case the Canadian Refugee Board found that a woman
who had been forced into an arranged marriage while still a minor, who
suffered repeated rapes and beatings by her husband, and who, over the
course of the seventeen-year marriage, was unable to obtain state pro-
tection against his violence, had established "good grounds for fearing
persecution by reason of her membership in a particular social group
.... ,"18' The Board found "Zimbabwean women or girls, forced to
marry according to the customary laws of Kuzvarira and Lobola share
common characteristics which constitute a social group."' 8 2 Even
though the Board did not address the intimate violence in its characteri-
zation of the social group, by recognizing her claim as one of a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group, it opened the door to use of this ground as the basis of
gender-based claims where the feared persecution is intimate violence.
In order to show that a battered woman is persecuted on account of
her membership in a particular social group, there are generally two
ways to characterize the group. One approach is to argue that she is a
member of the social group of women and she has a well-founded fear
of persecution based on her membership in that group.' 83 The bat-
tering occurs against her because of her gender-based status-her
"social group"--of woman. This social group must be seen in its social
context of a woman as considered or treated as inferior to men, as prop-
erty of men, and as subject to male domination without regard to her
own will. It could further be argued that the state is failing to protect
her simply by virtue of the fact of her gender. It is only due to her gen-
der that another individual is allowed to beat her or threaten her on an
ongoing basis. It is only due to her gender that she is denied protec-
tion-either through lack of recourse or through failure or refusal to
enforce existing laws that could protect her against such conduct.
Alternatively, the social group could be defined as women who are
battered and have no recourse to state protection. Here the argument is
that it is the state's failure to protect the battered woman that makes the
acts of intimate violence rise to the level of persecution. Under this the-
ory, the battered woman is not being denied protection because she is a
woman per se. In most instances, if that same woman were assaulted on
the street by an unknown assailant she would receive police assistance
and could, if the assailant were found, prosecute him in criminal court
for his violence. Rather, it is because her attacker is her husband, boy-
friend, or other male intimate that the state is refusing to grant her pro-
180. CRDD U92-06668, E.R. Smith, Daya, Feb. 19, 1993.
181. Id. at 17. In addition, the court also sustained her claim of religious-based
persecution because she was a Christian and a practicing Catholic, and her husband
practiced polygamy.
182. Id. at 16.
183. Thanks to Jim Hathaway for bringing this point home to me and to Patrick
Young for helping me clarify my thoughts on it.
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tection. This makes her vulnerable not because she is a woman, but
because she is a woman who is prey to a male intimate.
Whichever way the social group is defined, the arguments in sup-
port of either are very similar. It is clear that both of these social groups
exist as real social phenomena and that the group members face distinc-
tive risks. In most societies, battering is a real, if often unrecognized,
phenomenon, and one to which many women are subjected. The
"immutable" characteristics that a woman in either social group pos-
sesses are twofold. The first is her gender. The second, which in all
conscience she should not be forced or required to change, is her belief
in her right to be free from the arbitrary violence of a male intimate-
someone to whom she is known and who has access to her. This belief
in the right to physical and mental integrity, recognized as a basic
human right protected under international law, is one that no individual
should ever be forced to abandon, or be allowed to suffer its violation
without protection from and punishment of the perpetrator.
The refusal to submit to the domination of her batterer is a charac-
teristic she should not, as a matter of conscience of the highest order, be
required to change. It is the unequivocal and active refusal to submit to
male domination, ultimately by fleeing, in addition to her efforts to
obtain protection from state authorities or the failure of the state to pro-
vide any such protection for her, that identify her and single her out for
persecution by the government. The government seeks to uphold the
male dominant culture by withholding its protection from members of
this social group while extending it to other segments of society.
Battered women face distinctive risks. Those who come forward
under circumstances where there is no protection under the laws, or
where such protection is routinely denied because of the context of the
violence, risk further enraging their batterer and thus furthering endan-
gering themselves. Where there is no legal or police protection, or inso-
far as it exists but is unenforced against men who batter their wives or
other intimates, these women remain in a constant state of risk.
B. Political Opinion
A second basis for the fear of persecution based on intimate violence
falls under the rubric of political opinion. The opinion expressed is that
of rejecting the social norm that a man has the right to dominate his wife
or female companion. 184
Neither the Refugee Convention nor the Refugee Act of 1980 and
its implementing regulations define what constitutes a political opinion;
the UNHCR Handbook, however, addresses this issue. While the discus-
sion under political opinion focuses on persecution by the gover-
ment,1 85 it is clear under the Handbook that non-state actors can be the
agents of persecution where their actions "are knowingly tolerated by
184. Thanks to Rhonda Copelon for her inspiration on this point.
185. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 22, paras. 80-86.
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the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer
effective protection."'18 6 Similarly, although there is widespread agree-
ment that actual or feared persecution by a non-govermental actor is
sufficient to sustain a claim, much of the commentary and interpretation
of the political opinion ground is based on the expression or holding of
political views contrary to the government.' 8 7 Yet there is also support,
under U.S. case law, for the view that an asylum claim based on political
opinion is sustainable where the actual or would-be persecutor is a force
or an individual not connected with the state. 188
Without specifically naming political opinion as the basis for the
claim, the UNHCR Guidelines recognize that a woman's claim to refugee
status may be based on a fear of being persecuted for "having tran-
gressed the[ir] society's laws or customs regarding the role of
women"1 8 9 or her being "accused of violating social mores."' 9 0
In specifically addressing political opinion as a ground for gender-
based persecution claims, the Canadian guidelines state: "A woman
who opposes institutionalized discrimination of women, or expresses
views of independence from male social/cultural dominance in her soci-
ety, may be found to fear persecution for reasons of imputed political
opinion."' 9 '
The INS Manual states that in order to show a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion, "[t]he applicant must show
either that he or she has been persecuted for this dissent [from the polit-
ical views espoused by the government], or that his or her fear of such
persecution is well-founded."' 9 2
The Manual refers to an early BIA case, Matter of Pierre,193 which
pre-dates the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. In that case, a Haitian
woman sought withholding of deportation pursuant to INA § 243(h)
based on her husband's threats to her life, including his attempt to kill
her by burning down the house where she had been living.' 94 The man
was a deputy in the Haitian government. In denying her claim, the BIA
restated its view that "persecution at the hands of individuals not con-
186. Id. para. 65. See discussion supra Part IV on state liability for acts of persecu-
tion by private actors.
187. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 146, at 31-38; HATHAWAY, supra note 51, at
149-57.
188. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Pierre, 15 1. & N.
Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
189. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 102.
190. Id.
191. CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at 4. The Guidelines continue with the
comment, "(i.e., she is perceived by the established political/social structure as
expressing politically antagonistic views.)" This comment appears to refer to gov-
ernment enforced repression such as the forced wearing of the veil in Iran. The
language is nonetheless relevant here because, as discussed infra, U.S. courts have
recognized asylum claims based on political opinion grounds where the persecutor is
a private individual or a force not connected to the government.
192. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 41.
193. 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
194. Id. at 462.
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nected with any government" could support a claim for 243(h) relief.'9 5
In this case, however, the BIA found that she had failed to establish that
her persecution was on account of any of the five enumerated grounds,
and that she had "presented no evidence to support" her claim that "the
government of Haiti would not intervene to prevent or punish alleged
unlawful acts performed by her husband."' 196
In reaching its conclusion, the BIA left open the possibility that
where a showing could be made of unwillingness or inability of the state
to intervene and a showing that the acts or feared acts are due to one of
the five grounds, such a claim might be sustainable. As the argument
that the actual and feared persecution was on account of an enumerated
ground was not made in that case, nor was there any showing that the
Haitian government would not afford her any protection, it remains
speculative as to what the result might have been had these two ele-
ments been met. The language in the decision does leave open the
possibility that a favorable rendering might be possible had these
requirements be fulfilled.
The INS Manual, in stating that personal disputes standing alone
are insufficient to form the basis of a claim, goes on to recognize a piv-
otal Ninth Circuit case which "held that an abused woman was a refugee,
since the abuser's status as a Salvadoran sergeant gave credence to his
threat to expose her as a subversive if she reported his criminal conduct
toward her."'197 The Ninth Circuit, in its pathbreaking decision in Lazo-
Majano v. INS, 19 8 raises for the first and only time in a circuit court deci-
sion on asylum eligibility, the notion that a woman resisting violence
perpetrated against her by an intimate companion is expressing a polit-
ical opinion. 199 Lazo-Majano was a Salvadoran woman whose husband
had fled the country because of his right-wing paramilitary activities. 20 0
Over a period of several months she was repeatedly harassed, forced to
perform unpaid labor, and raped by a sergeant in the Salvadoran mili-
tary. In striking language, the court stated:
If the situation is seen in its social context, [Sergeant] Zuniga is
asserting the political opinion that a man has a right to dominate and he has
persecuted [Lazo-Majano] to force her to accept this opinion without
rebellion.... His statement [that he treated her as he did because he was
seeking revenge] reflects a much more generalized animosity to the oppo-
site sex, an assertion of a political aspiration and the desire to suppress
opposition to it. [She] was not permitted ... to hold an opinion to the
contrary. When by flight, she asserted one, she became exposed to persecution for her
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id. The Board goes on in dictum to state that "even if the respondent had
shown that the government of Haiti was unable or unwilling to restrain her husband,
she could not qualify for temporary withholding of deportation," as she had not
shown his actions to be on account of one of the five grounds. Id. at 463.
197. INS MANUAL, supra note 14, at 42.
198. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
199. Id. at 1435-36.
200. Id. at 1433.
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assertion. Persecution threatened her because of her political opinion.20 1
The court expressed another significant development in that case
by finding that she did, in fact, have another political opinion in addition
to her refusal to submit to physical and mental male domination. The
court found that her additional political opinion is that the "Armed
Force is responsible for lawlessness, rape, torture, and murder. Such
views constitute a political opinion. And she has been persecuted for
possessing it. Because she believes that no political control exists to
restrain a brutal sergeant in the Armed Force she has been subjected to
his brutality." 20 2 Ultimately, the court rested its holding on the basis of
imputed political opinion that she was a subversive. The court found
that even if she were without any political opinion, "the cynical imputa-
tion of political opinion to her is what counts under both statutes....
[O]ne must continue to look at the person from the perspective of the
persecutor. If the persecutor thinks the person guilty of a political opin-
ion, then the person is at risk." 203
This case is significant for its recognition of two crucial elements of
an asylum claim based on intimate violence. The first is that resistance
to male domination is an expression of a political opinion, and the sec-
ond is that a belief that the state will not afford protection against such
violence also constitutes a political opinion. Either of these elements
can form the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution.
The Supreme Court recently stated that the persecutor's motive
must relate to the basis on which an asylum applicant is claiming to have
a well-founded fear, and that the individual must possess the opinion.
"The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account of...
201. Id. at 1435 (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. Id. In an extremely restrictive reading of a claim based on political opinion,
the Fifth Circuit denied asylum to a woman who had been brutally raped, along with
three cousins, after being forced to watch her uncle and a male cousin tortured and
murdered by Salvadoran soldiers. In that case, Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d
285 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987), the uncle was active in the peas-
ant land reform movement and had already been threatened on at least one occasion.
The court upheld the Board's finding that "the record does not establish that [Ms.
Campos] was persecuted on account of any political opinion she herself possesses or
was believed by the attackers to possess." Id. at 289 (emphasis in original). Campos-
Guardado also raised a claim of well-founded fear of persecution based on member-
ship in a particular social group, but the BIA found that the social group was directly
related to the political opinion issue and did not rule on it separately other than to
state that the evidence "was insufficient to establish that the harm Ms. Campos fears
is based on political opinion, group membership, or a combination of the two." Id. at
289-90. The Fifth Circuit did not do its own evaluation of the social group claim.
Moreover, in discussing the burden of proof in an asylum claim, the Fifth Circuit
found that regardless of which standard was applied, Ms. Campos-Guardado did not
meet her burden. There are numerous flaws with this decision. For purposes here,
however, suffice it to note that not only did the Fifth Circuit refuse to recognize an
imputed political opinion basis of her claim, it also seemed willing to dismiss the
serious gender-based persecution inflicted on Campos-Guardado without any exami-
nation of the context in which it occurred or the political nature of the violence. For
a critique of this decision, see Castel, supra note 131.
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political opinion' in 101 (a)(42) is persecution on account of the victim's
political opinion, not the persecutor's. ' 20 4 The court went on to state
that the victim must fear persecution "because of that political
opinion." 20 5
The Supreme Court's decision was directed exclusively at forced
recruitment and is arguably only applicable in that context. In the case
of resisting forcible recruitment, there are generally either threats made
of future harm if the individual refuses to join the armed forces, 20 6 or
the person is forced to serve and manages to escape and flee.20 7 In the
case of intimate violence, the resistance is similar in that it is expressive
conduct reflecting a political opinion, but it is dissimilar in that her
resistance is more than unarticulated neutrality or failure to take a stand.
In the case of intimate violence a woman is resisting on-going harm or
threats of harm from a persecutor who is in close and constant proximity
to her. She is not fleeing some distant possibility of harm, but rather an
immediate and direct threat to her physical safety and well-being. Fur-
ther, it is not resistance to perform any particular act or duty but rather
resistance to dominance of her will and to actual or threatened physical
violence. As such, Zacarias does not overcome a claim for asylum in the
context of intimate violence as the basis of the fear.20 8
When a woman is the victim of intimate violence and seeks protec-
tion from the government, or flees because the government does not
provide any protection, she is refusing to submit to the norm that it is a
man's right to beat his wife or common union partner. This refusal to
submit is political resistance. When the government refuses to protect a
204. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992) (emphasis in original).
205. Id. (emphasis in original). In a scathing dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, acknowledged the "political character of an alien's
refusal to take arms .... The record in this case is more than adequate to support
the conclusion that this respondent's refusal was a form of expressive conduct that
constituted the statement of a 'political opinion' within the meaning of § 208(a)." Id.
at 819. For a critique of the Supreme Court's holding in Zacarias, see articles cited in
supra note 18.
206. See, e.g., Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
207. See, e.g., Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
208. The Ninth Circuit, in a decision remanded to it for review under the Zacarias
holding, accepted the Court's rule that an individual claiming "persecution must
present some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the persecutor's motive . . .
stem[ming] from section 1101's 'persecution on account of' language." The court
maintained, however, that:
Imputed political opinion is still a valid basis for relief after Elias-
Zacarias.... [E]vidence of motive is required, but imputed political opinion,
by definition, includes an element of motive. A persecutor falsely attributes
an opinion to the victim, and then persecutes the victim because of that mis-
taken belief about the victim's views.
Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601-02 (1992).
Moreover, the INS General Counsel specifically has held that the doctrine of
imputed political opinion still constitutes a legitimate basis for an asylum claim in the
wake of Zacarias. Legal Opinion: Continued Viability of Imputed Political Opinion
(Jan. 19, 1993), and Addendum (Mar. 4, 1993), INS General Counsel, reprinted in 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 14,498 (Apr. 12, 1993).
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woman against a force that would persecute her as a result of her polit-
ical resistance, the government is in fact persecuting the woman on
account of her political opinion.
Alternatively, the use of violence to maintain a woman in sex-stere-
otyped roles is persecution on account of her political opinion because
the man's acts are a form of political repression, designed to repress her
from "expressing" her political opinion of not accepting the traditional
expected role of a woman. If we look at resisting intimate violence, or at
intimate violence itself, as a form of punishment for resisting "stere-
otypical role restictions," then we see the man's behavior as identical to
what the "totalitarian state" does to political dissidents. 20 9 As dis-
cussed, this conduct is expressly outlawed by customary international
law as well as by international treaties such as the Convention Against
Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 210
As such, men are carrying out the wishes of the state in a kind of "paral-
lel state."' 211 That is, the "home" functions as a microcosm of the state.
The state allows the home to exist under a separate dominion or author-
ity that mirrors or parallels that of the state. In allowing this, the state
implicitly endorses the act and therefore has culpability. This argument
takes intimate violence out of the realm of the "private sphere" and
brings it into the "public sphere" because it has to do with repression of
political expression. 212
Conclusion
Intimate violence constitutes persecution, either in the form of torture
at its worst, and serious violations of human rights in its least offensive
light. Where acts of intimate violence occur there is a cognizable human
rights violation, even though the person committing the acts is a private
individual and not the state. As such, the state has a duty to protect the
victim from those violent acts. Where the state does not do so, either
through a failure to enforce existing laws or through the failure to rec-
ognize intimate violence as a cognizable harm for which state protection
should be provided, the state is accountable for the harm she may suffer
at the hands of her batterer. This harm may be threatened or inflicted
upon a woman due to her membership in a particular social group or on
account of her political opinion.
When a woman's human rights are violated, she is as entitled as any
man to protection and redress. The human rights community is already
awakening to the fact that battered women deserve protection under
human rights doctrine. The law must recognize what society pro-
pounds. It is time U.S. laws embrace advances being made by the
209. See generally Copelon, supra note 98.
210. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
211. I borrow this term from Celina Romany. See Romany, supra note 27.
212. See idL for a discussion of public-private distinction in international human
rights law.
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UNHCR, in Canada, and in the international human rights community
generally. Providing protection for women seeking refuge from inti-
mate violence under U.S. asylum laws is an essential step toward further-
ing the human rights of women.
